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[DP 201717] Yves Guéron, Andrew Choi, Syngjoo Choi, and Eungik Lee, "Irreversibility and Monitoring in Dynamic Games: Experimental Evidence"

최근 글

[DP 201716] Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, and Fuhito Kojim, "Time to Match and Fertility: Transferable Utility"

[Seminar] Characterizing Envy-Free, Strategy Proof, and Monotonic Mechanisms in Queuing Problems

[Seminar] Characterizing Envy-Free, Strategy Proof, and Monotonic Mechanisms in Queuing Problems

일시 : 2017년 11월 27일 월요일 15:30-16:30
장소 : 16동 655호
발표 : Duygu Yengin(The University of Adelaide)
공동주최 : BK21플러스 경제학 사업단

 [Seminar] Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects

[Seminar] Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects 일시 : 2017년 11월 21일(화) 15:30-16:30 장소 : 16동 655호 발표 : Yan Long(New York University Abu Dhabi)
공동주최 : BK21플러스 경제학 사업단
Abstract
Strategy-proof, budget-balanced, and envy-free rank mechanisms assign q identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of surplus loss to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-zero valuations. The smallest efficiency loss (n−q)/(n^2−n) is uniquely achieved by the following simple allocation rule: assign one object to each of the q − 1 agents with the highest valuations, a large probability to the agent with the qth highest valuation, and the remaining probability to the agent with the (q + 1)th highest valuation.

발표논문은 여기를 눌러주세요.

[Seminar] Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains.

[Seminar] Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains.

일시 : 2017년 11월 23일 목요일 15:00-16:00
장소 : 16동 655호
발표 : Huaxia Zeng(Sun Yat-sen University)
공동주최 : BK21플러스 경제학 사업단


Abstract:
We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion of connectedness (Monjardet, 2009) to establish a particular class of top-separable domains: connected+ domains, and show that in the class of minimally rich and connected+ domains, the multidimensional single-peakedness restriction is necessary and sufficient for the design of a flexible random social choice function that is unanimous and strategy-proof. Such a flexible function is distinct from generalized random dictatorships in that it allows for a systematic notion of compromise. Our characterization remain…

[DP 2017R201620] 오성재, 주병기, "한국의 소득기회불평등에 대한 연구"

[TS KIM Memorial Seminar] Fair Mixing of Public Outcomes under Dichotomous Preferences

11월 8일 (수)에 Hervé Moulin (University of Glasgow and HSE St Petersburg) 교수를 모시고 아래와 같이 김태성 기념 세미나가 개최됩니다.
◈ 주 제 : "Fair Mixing of Public Outcomes under Dichotomous Preferences"
◈ 강 사 :  Hervé Moulin (University of Glasgow and HSE St Petersburg)
◈ 일 시 : 2017년 11월 8일 수요일 15:00 ~ 16:30
◈ 장 소 : 사회과학대학 (16동) 6층 655호 (경제학부 세미나실)
◈ 주 관 : 서울대 경제연구소, 분배정의 연구센터,
경제학부, BK21플러스. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- On Wednesday November 8, TS Kim seminar will be held as follows.
◼ Title: "Fair Mixing of Public Outcomes under Dichotomous Preferences"
◼ Presenter: Hervé Moulin (University of Glasgow and HSE St Petersburg)
◼ Time: Wednesday, November 8, 2017, 15:00-16:30
◼ Place:  Building 16, Room 655 (6th floor)
◼ Host: SNU Institute of Economic Research, Center for Distributive Justice,
Department of Economics, BK 21 Plus.