[Seminar] Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
일시 : 2017년 11월 21일(화) 15:30-16:30
장소 : 16동 655호
발표 : Yan Long(New York University Abu Dhabi)
공동주최 : BK21플러스 경제학 사업단
공동주최 : BK21플러스 경제학 사업단
Abstract
Strategy-proof, budget-balanced, and envy-free rank mechanisms assign q identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of surplus loss to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-zero valuations. The smallest efficiency loss (n−q)/(n^2−n) is uniquely achieved by the following simple allocation rule: assign one object to each of the q − 1 agents with the highest valuations, a large probability to the agent with the qth highest valuation, and the remaining probability to the agent with the (q + 1)th highest valuation.
발표논문은 여기를 눌러주세요.
Strategy-proof, budget-balanced, and envy-free rank mechanisms assign q identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of surplus loss to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-zero valuations. The smallest efficiency loss (n−q)/(n^2−n) is uniquely achieved by the following simple allocation rule: assign one object to each of the q − 1 agents with the highest valuations, a large probability to the agent with the qth highest valuation, and the remaining probability to the agent with the (q + 1)th highest valuation.
발표논문은 여기를 눌러주세요.
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